INTRODUCTION Hedley Bull's The Anarchical Society is the first English School text that addresses, albeit
briefly, international environmental politics. Bull's interest in environmental issues is motivated mainly by his desire to refute claims that 'the states system is an obstacle to the attainment of man's ecological objective of living in harmony with his environment ' (1977, 283) . The book does not discuss climate change as such. Published in 1977, five years after the first UN environment conference but two years before the first World Climate Conference, The Anarchical Society conceives of environmental issues as a set of distinct problems that require international scientific cooperation and environmental management. By contrast, climate change has emerged today as an all-encompassing global ecological threat that requires the wholesale de-carbonization of the global economy. It is, as Hoffmann suggests, 'perhaps the global challenge of modern times ' (2013, 3) . Had Bull lived to observe the rise of international climate politics since the 1990s, would he have arrived at a different assessment of the environmental agenda? Would he still view global environmental politics through the same pluralist, state-centric, lens that is at the heart of The Anarchical Society?
This essay offers a close reading of Bull's classic text in an effort to apply his theoretical perspective to the international politics of climate change. My objective is to 2 explore what contribution pluralist English School theory can make to our understanding of how international society can respond to global warming, and what its limitations are. After reviewing Bull's discussion of environmental issues in The Anarchical Society, which can be found in a brief passage on 'Man and the Environment' in chapter 12 and a few short comments that are dispersed throughout the book, I explore the core tenets of pluralist English School theory and how they apply to climate change. This is followed by a discussion of the possibility of a transition towards a solidarist response to environmental threats, which Bull briefly hints at but never fully explores, and a concluding assessment of Bull's overall argument.
BULL ON 'MAN AND THE ENVIRONMENT'
Man-made climate change, which is caused by emissions of CO 2 and other greenhouse gases (GHGs) such as methane and nitrous oxide, is one of the major environmental threats that the world faces today. The increase in GHG concentrations in the atmosphere has already led to an average warming of global temperatures of around 0.8°C since the late nineteenth century and, if emissions continue unabated, we are likely to experience a warming of at least 4°C or more over the course of this century. While global average temperatures have fluctuated in the past, the rapid increase in temperatures to a level that has likely not been seen for the last 10 million years will irrevocably change the human geography of the planet. Melting ice caps and glaciers, rising sea levels, shifts in weather patterns and precipitation, further desertification, acidification of oceans, and the destruction of entire ecosystems will bring about fundamental changes to the way human societies are organized and sustain themselves (Stern 2015, 3-32) . Given the massive cost of adapting to a changing climate and the distributional conflicts that this will cause worldwide, climate change is emerging as a major disruptive force in international political and economic relations. Clearly, climate change is 3 no longer just a scientific or environmental issue. Increasingly, climate change ought to be an integral part of any study of the foundations for order in world politics.
Bull's The Anarchical Society does not mention climate change as a threat to international order. This is not surprising, given that Bull was working on the book at a time when climate change, although attracting growing scientific attention, had not yet been recognized by policymakers as a major threat. In the 1970s, the scientific community was still debating whether rising GHG emissions would lead to global cooling or warming, and the international environmental agenda was dominated by other environmental concerns, such as resource scarcity, marine pollution, and acid rain. Evidence of a warming climate was mounting during the second half of the 1970s, however, and by the time of the first World Climate Conference, convened in February 1979, global warming was beginning to emerge as an issue of global concern. Still, it took until the late 1980s for multilateral negotiations to commence on the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), which was adopted in 1992.
Although failing to address climate change, Bull was the first English School theorist to write about international environmental politics. While the earliest efforts to create an international environmental agenda can be traced back to the time before the First World War, it was the UN environment conference in Stockholm in 1972 that formally established international society's responsibility to protect the global environment (Falkner 2012) .
Curiously, Bull does not mention the Stockholm conference or subsequent developments, such as the creation of the UN Environment Programme (1973) and various environmental treaties; nor is he interested in investigating the reasons behind the sudden emergence of global environmentalism. Instead, he takes it as given that environmental protection is one of the 'advanced or secondary goals that are a feature of an international society in which a 4 consensus has been reached about a wider range of objectives than mere coexistence ' (1977, 70) .
For Bull, the interesting point about environmentalism is that it gives rise to a discourse that challenges the existing international order. In a brief section of not more than three pages, which appears in chapter 12 on 'The Obsolescence of the States System' (1977, , Bull considers-and dismisses-the suggestion that the states system has become obsolete because of its inability to deal with global environmental threats (see also Linklater and Suganami 2006, 68-70; Paterson 2005, 164-7) . The 1970s had seen the first wave of writings on environmental matters by International Relations scholars (for an overview, see Stevis 2014, 18-22) , many of which viewed state-centric politics with scepticism and argued for an alternative world order. Such proposals either proceeded along cosmopolitan lines of empowering centralized international authorities, regional authorities and transnational actors (Falk 1971) or opted for more authoritarian solutions (Ophuls 1977) . At the time, Richard Falk's book This Endangered Planet (1971) was particularly influential in shaping environmentalism's anti-statism, and it is this text that Bull uses as a foil to his own argument in defence of the state-centric international order.
1 Arguing against the then widespread notion of the 'spaceship earth' (Ward 1966 ) that requires 'global unity and global planning' (Bull 1977, 293) to steer it safely towards environmental sustainability, Bull makes three specific points.
1 Bull knew Falk well and counted him as a friend. Although setting out to dismiss the core of Falk's argument, Bull was careful to acknowledge his friend in the preface to The Anarchical Society, referring to Falk's views as 'one of the most significant points of departure in the study of world politics today' before remarking that 'the attention I devote to refuting him should be taken as a compliment ' (1977, ix) .
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His first point is the classic pluralist argument that humanity and the society of states are characterized by a profound diversity of values and interests, and that this prevents sustained international cooperation on global challenges, including ecological ones. In Bull's words, it is not the division of the world into sovereign states as such but 'human disagreement and conflict in the ecological realm ' (1977, 293-4) that stands in the way of a common global approach. In a concession to Falk and other environmental writers, Bull goes on to acknowledge that human society may have to tolerate certain restrictions on population growth and resource consumption, to avert a universal 'tragedy of the commons ' (1977, 294) . This is the closest that Bull comes to accepting the then widespread, though controversial, theory that the global expansion of human societies and economic activity was close to breaching ecological boundaries (Meadows and Meadows 1972) . But instead of thinking through the consequences of this neo-Malthusian logic, Bull merely notes that a system of sovereign states is indeed dysfunctional insofar as it could never impose such limitationsbut neither could alternatives to international society, unless they were to curb human freedoms to stay within ecological constraints. Having seemingly accepted the need for certain limits to growth in the future, Bull's point is merely to argue that all global political responses, whether they are found through international society or an alternative world order, suffer from the same structural problem of value and interest plurality. Environmentalists are thus wrong to assume that an institutionally reorganized international system with a central authority could bring about the global unity and solidarity that is needed to address the ecological crisis.
In his second point, Bull develops the pluralist argument further by highlighting the importance of international order as a precondition for tackling ecological problems. A society of sovereign states can make a valuable contribution mainly because it creates stability and order against the background of normative pluralism: 'Without such a basis of 6 minimum order it is scarcely possible that common issues of the environmental can be faced at all ' (1977, 294 ' (1977, 294-5) , before going on to suggest that in order for humanity to tackle environmental threats, there would need to be 'a greater sense of human cohesion than now exists ' (1977, 295) . Having so far defended pluralist international society against the vision of 'post-Westphalian' world politics, Bull now appears to suggest that the pluralist logic of coexistence may eventually have to give way to a solidarist project of creating greater political cohesion and human solidarity. But instead of explaining the implications of this concession, Bull returns to his initial starting point that it is the states system through which 'a greater sense of human solidarity in relation to environmental threats may emerge' (1977, 294) . Rather than consider a cohesive world society as an alternative to the current system of states, we should see its emergence as being dependent on the preservation and Bull's pluralism that need to be considered in this context: the plurality of values and interests, which is said to prevent global solidarity in the battle against global warming; the pluralist logic of co-existence as the basis for (limited) international cooperation; the centrality of the state system and the role that states play in the search for an international 8 solution; and the special role played by great powers and the primary institution of great power management.
Value Pluralism and Conflict
Starting from the pluralist premise that conflict over individual and societal values is an inevitable condition of humanity, The Anarchical Society takes a sceptical stance on the possibility of deep international cooperation. Bull notes that only a minimal consensus exists across societies on the need to protect the common primary goals of international life: life, promises, and property (1977, 19) . Beyond this, pluralists do not expect a deeper sense of global solidarity to emerge, let alone form the basis for sustained international cooperation. It is telling that in his discussion of the rise of environmental politics, Bull treats environmental issues as discrete problems of international management, most of which concern behaviour that is appropriate not to the elementary or primary goals of international life, but rather to those more advanced or secondary goals that are a feature of an international society in which a consensus has been reached about a wider range of objectives than mere coexistence. (1977, 70) However, in one brief passage Bull hints at the possibility that, if the ecological crisis turns out to be more severe, then more drastic international restrictions would need to be imposed. Arguing in the context of the 'limits to growth' debate, Bull refers to human freedoms with regard to population growth and economic development that may need to be curbed in order for humanity to stay within its global ecological boundaries (1977, 294) .
When seen in the context of the contemporary debate on global warming, this passage can also be read as a concession that if ecological problems such as climate change pose an existential threat to humankind, then a business-as-usual response involving international cooperation in the pursuit of secondary goals will not suffice. The fact remains, though, as
Bull notes, that the international states system offers the only realistic means for a collective response, and that no other global political system could provide a viable alternative (1977, 294) . In other words, climate change could indeed become the globally unifying threat that brushes aside societal differences in values and interests, but international society would remain our best bet for organizing a global rescue.
How close has the world come to such a scenario? Despite the widespread expectation that a warming climate will harm humanity overall, specific climate impacts are, in fact, unequally distributed around the world. Rising sea levels will inflict damage on coastal areas and may submerge low-lying island states, but not inland territories. Changes in weather patterns will lead to greater droughts in some regions, and more extreme rainfall in others, but increases in precipitation and a rise in land temperatures is already benefiting farming in Greenland and may lead to greater agricultural productivity in other countries too (e.g.
Canada, Russia) ('Greenland reaps benefits of global warming', 2013). And even though the majority of countries will suffer adverse effects, the degree to which societies will perceive climate change as an existential threat is bound to vary considerably around the world.
Furthermore, countries will also differ with regard to the value they attach to ensuring global climate stability through mitigation measures, as compared to pursuing other policies that either focus narrowly on economic growth or adaptation to a warming climate. In other words, even where climate change poses a common threat, the willingness to act against it will be unevenly distributed.
Bull's value pluralism thus remains an important starting point for thinking through an appropriate and realistic international climate strategy. Despite the growing perception of climate change as a universal threat to humankind, the difficulty of agreeing common principles for reducing emissions has not gone away. Indeed, Bull's pluralist scepticism towards the idea of global solidarity is borne out by the agonizingly slow progress that has been made in over two decades of multilateral negotiations under the auspices of the UNFCCC. Even after the 2015 Paris Agreement (Falkner 2016b ), Bull would not be far off the mark with his claim that states have 'only the most rudimentary sense of the common good of the world as a whole ' (1977, 81) .
The Pluralist Logic of Coexistence
In Bull's conception of a pluralist international society, the behavior of states is primarily driven by a logic of coexistence (Jackson 2000, 178-82; Buzan 2004, 143) . ' (1977, 19) .
Would a pluralist international society be able to achieve the level of cooperation that is required to avert such a threat?
As Buzan argues, there is nothing in the pluralist logic of coexistence to prevent states from establishing some minimal level of international cooperation on environmental issues (2004, 145) . Particularly where core state interests are at stake and effective measures to deal with the ecological problem are available, states may choose to act collectively to prevent global environmental danger. This was the case with international cooperation to protect the ozone layer, and major GHG emitters could conceivably be compelled to take similar action to protect themselves and international society against runaway global warming. In this view,
Bull's pluralist stance would be entirely consistent with a modicum of international environmental cooperation to tackle dangerous climate change.
But despite recent moves to view climate change as a security threat (Busby 2008;  Scheffran and Battaglini 2011), securitization has not changed the underlying logic of international climate politics. This is partly because climate change will play out over a long period and does not pose an imminent threat. Its impacts will vary around the world, with the heaviest burden falling on poorer and weaker developing countries. By comparison, the major powers face only weak or uncertain security threats, with some potentially benefiting from rising temperatures. Given that the costs of mitigating climate change are also unequally distributed, it is unlikely that the great powers will arrive at similar cost-benefit calculations that would compel them to act together to reduce future global warming. Given the high upfront costs of taking action, uncertainty about future impacts and pervasive free-riding incentives (Keohane and Victor 2011) , it is far more likely that the pluralist logic of coexistence will prevent deep forms of international cooperation and will drive great powers towards predominantly national response strategies, mainly in the form of adaptation to climate change. And even if mitigation was in the interest of some great powers, they may 13 find it preferable to take unilateral action, e.g. geo-engineering (Victor, et al. 2009 ), rather than contribute to a collective mitigation effort. Either way, it is reasonable to conclude that if states follow a pluralist logic it is unlikely that they will produce the comprehensive and timely response that is needed to prevent dangerous climate change.
State-centrism
A further implication of Bull's pluralist stance is his insistence that any global response to climate change will need to be channelled through the society of states. Bull is adamant that the nation-state is the sole legitimate representative of individual societies, and the states system is the only viable form of global political organization that can resolve differences in interests and values between societies. It is this unequivocal state-centrism that is perhaps
Bull's most widely noted contribution to the study of international environmental politics (Paterson 2005 ; see also Hurrell and Kingsbury 1992, 5) . Indeed, as was noted earlier, Bull set up the debate on environmental issues as one between two diametrically opposed camps:
environmentalists who advocate the creation of supranational authorities or a world government and representatives of the state-centric international society tradition. Bull makes two arguments contra the supra-nationalists: first, the states system is a necessary condition for organizing a global ecological response, and second, even if it becomes necessary to achieve a 'greater sense of human cohesion' as the basis for international environmental cooperation, the path towards such a solidarist future runs through the state-centric system (1977, 295) . In other words, the states system already performs vital functions in the pursuit of global environmental goals, and any improvement on this would have to build on, rather than replace, international society. (Biermann et al, 2009 ). The growth of a multilevel and multi-actor network of transnational climate governance is indeed one of the most remarkable developments in recent years (Bulkeley et al. 2014; Hoffmann 2011) . Rather than rely solely on the regulatory authority of the nation-state, more and more municipal authorities, cities, regional governments, businesses and NGOs are taking the initiative in setting climate norms, disseminating lowcarbon solutions, and establishing private governance mechanisms. The field of climate governance has become crowded, with state and non-state actors engaged in a dense web of interactions, reinforcing each other's efforts but also acting independently from each other.
As will be discussed below, Bull's state-centric perspective, held back by a simplistic binary distinction between the realms of international society and world society, offers little analytical purchase when it comes to advancing our understanding of this growing transnationalization of climate governance beyond the intergovernmental regime. end of the conference to forge a short political agreement (Falkner, Stephan, et al. 2010 ). The so-called Copenhagen Accord was eventually rejected at the COP plenary in Copenhagen, but its principles were later integrated into the Cancun COP agreements in 2010, thus laying the foundations for the shift in the regulatory approach that underpins the Paris Agreement.
Great Powers and Great Power Management
Ever since, the major powers have taken a more proactive role, agreeing the broad outlines of mitigation burden-sharing among themselves as part of the overall multilateral agreement.
Both the EU and US engaged in bilateral talks with China and India on how to promote lowcarbon technologies in emerging economies (Torney 2015) , and in a sign of the gradual convergence of US and Chinese positions the two powers signed a bilateral agreement in November 2014 that established the mitigation pledges that both countries made as part of the Paris Agreement (Vogler 2016, 127-8 ).
Bull's account of the primary institution of great power management offers a useful starting point for investigating the changing role of great powers in international climate politics. Great powers are a simple fact of international life that 'cannot be wished away' (Bull 1977, 298) , and Bull would expect them to have a decisive influence over outcomes in international climate politics. Somewhat counter-intuitively, this was not the case in the early phase of the international climate regime, when the G77 succeeded in exempting developing countries from mitigation obligations. Tony Brenton, a British negotiator at the 1992 Rio Summit, is not alone in noting that 'it is difficult not to be struck by the imbalance in these commitments between the developed countries and the developing countries' (Brenton 1994, 195) . Concerned with healing the North-South rift, many Western powers were willing to make this concession in order to get universal support for the UNFCCC. As the political salience of climate change increased in subsequent years, however, the United States and other Western powers gradually rolled back earlier commitments and eventually forced a reinterpretation of the UNFCCC's common but differentiated responsibilities (CBDR) norm.
At least since the 2009 Copenhagen conference, great power politics has returned to leave its mark on the climate change regime (Brenton 2013) .
However, Bull's understanding of great powers adds an important dimension that sets it apart from standard realist interpretations. For Bull, great powers are as much a social construction as they are the result of material power asymmetry. Great powers perform certain functions in international society-maintaining the balance of power, forcing cooperative solutions-and in doing so they assert not only their power but also aspire to a privileged position that is legitimate. Great powers often act against the immediate interests of smaller powers, but their role can be considered legitimate where they pursue the collective interest in maintaining international order. As agents of a collective hegemony, great powers are 'recognised by others to have, and conceived by their own leaders and peoples to have, certain special rights and duties ' (1977, 202) . Legitimacy and hegemony are thus closely intertwined in Bull's and the English School's notion of power asymmetry and international hierarchy (Clark 2011) . In this sense, the need to gain and retain international legitimacy constrains great powers. Bull is unequivocal that 'when the great powers appear to be undermining order as well as denying justice, the legitimacy of their position is eroded' (1977, 229).
Bull's approach highlights two central issues in the way the great powers have engaged with the global climate challenge. First, by sheer size of their economic might and emissions profile, great powers are inevitably at the heart of the global warming problem. As major polluters, they are largely responsible for climate change and also possess de facto veto power in international climate politics. Any regime that is to produce viable solutions needs to reflect the reality of power asymmetry and accommodate the special interests of the great powers. At the same time, great powers themselves need to be concerned about the wider legitimacy of their international role and the outcome they promote within the multilateral regime (Eckersley 2007; Bukovansky et al. 2012) . For great power management to operate as an institutional feature of climate politics, great powers need to promote collective solutions that do not ignore the demands for international justice made by smaller powers. Thus, despite experimenting with potentially more effective minilateral solutions, none of the great powers have as yet walked away from the multilateral regime. The return of the United States to the multilateral effort under President Obama and the growing acceptance of mitigation responsibilities by the emerging powers of Asia suggests that, as Bull asserts in The Anarchical Society, great powers' 'freedom of manoeuvre is circumscribed by "responsibility" ' (1977, 229) . But Bull would have warned against exuberant expectations when it comes to great powers' concern for the global common good. The fact that they proclaim to be acting in the global interest does not turn them into 'great responsibles' or 'great indispensables ' (1977, 51) , and the election of US president Trump who has called global warming a 'hoax' underlines the fickle nature of great power support for global environmental protection. The need for legitimacy exerts some pressure on the largest emitters to contribute to the collective mitigation effort, but we are still far from effective great power management in the interest of a stable global climate.
TOWARDS A SOLIDARIST RESPONSE TO GLOBAL WARMING?
As we have seen, there are good reasons to suggest that the pluralist logic of coexistence alone cannot generate the kind of internationally coordinated response that could prevent dangerous levels of global warming. It is unsurprising, therefore, that analysts and policymakers have focused on how a solidarist response to climate change, built on strong international institutions and redistributive policies, can be constructed. The Anarchical Society implicitly acknowledges the possibility that the transition from a pluralist to a 19 solidarist form of international cooperation might be necessary (1977, . 2 Bull is not interested in thinking through how this transformation could come about, beyond noting that the states system is the means through which this can happen. But it is clear that Bull opens the door to a solidarist transformation of international society. To achieve the 'greater sense of human cohesion', states would need to 'extend the sense of common interests, common rules and common institutions that have moderated their conflicts in the past', and this concerns not only matters of peace and justice, but also 'environmental management ' (1977, 295) . This brief passage is the closest that Bull comes to endorsing a solidarist answer to the global ecological crisis, even if he does not believe that this can be realized in the short run.
How could a solidarist solution for climate change be found? As we have seen, Bull notes at various points that international society has already expanded the scope for international cooperation on environmental matters, through the creation of legal rules that advance 'secondary goals' based on an international consensus on international objectives that go beyond 'mere coexistence ' (1977, 70) . But the expansion of the scope of international law has not led to a strengthening of the rule of law in international relations (1977, 153) .
International environmental law exists within a state-centric system based on the rule of consent, i.e. the sovereign right of states to accept or reject international environmental regulations, and the unavoidable logic of pluralism holds back an expansion of international law beyond its state-centric limitations. But he is quick to dismiss the possibility of a political project that builds on cosmopolitan solidarism, merely noting that such ideas 'play very little part at all' in present conditions (1977, 85) . No agent exists to bring about this cosmopolitan vision. The self-appointed spokesmen of 'spaceship earth' have no representational legitimacy, just as environmental NGOs do not have the authority to define the interests of humankind (1977, ' (1977, 85) and thus have no authority in international relations (1977, 86) , or they are 'inherently revolutionary ' (1977, 88) due to their demands for global justice which requires a complete transformation of the international order. Having set up the discussion in these terms, Bull cannot but fail to recognize how political interventions originating in world society serve to complement and expand international governance, and how they end up redefining rather than undermining the legitimacy of nation-states in an era complex global governance. Not least for this reason, Bull's pluralist vision is a poor guide to the complex reality of global governance that has grown around the UNFCCC regime, and that is likely to gain in significance.
CONCLUSIONS
After over two decades of UNFCCC negotiations, the world is still awaiting an effective international response to the threat of global warming. If he were with us today, Bull would not be surprised at the meagre results of climate multilateralism. As he had argued in The Anarchical Society, the plurality of values and interests is holding back international society from developing a sense of common purpose in the fight against global ecological dangers.
Climate change may be posing an ever-greater threat to the wellbeing, and even survival, of humankind, but it is unlikely to induce the kind of global solidarity that would push aside distributional conflicts and normative differences between nations. As Bull stated in his last chapter, there are no easy 'solutions' for 'the way ahead ' (1977, 318-20 Although setting out to defend a state-centric international system characterized by power inequality, Bull was not blind to international society's limitations. As he acknowledges in The Anarchical Society, the society of states may have started to create international regulatory mechanisms, but it remains woefully weak when it comes to imposing constraints on population growth, resource consumption and industrial pollution.
Bull hinted at the need to move towards a solidarist form of international environmental cooperation, although he did not explore how this could come about. Nor did he have much faith in humanity's ability to move in this direction. To some extent, the Kyoto Protocol can be seen as an experiment in creating a solidarist response, based on the UNFCCC's climate protection norm, strong global equity principles and legally binding emission reductions.
However, state-centric solidarism did not get very far in climate politics. The Kyoto Protocol's top-down regulatory approach has been replaced by the Paris Agreement's more decentralized system of nationally determined pledges. Bull would most likely agree with spaceship earth' still lacks a voice that can speak with legitimate authority in international politics and that 'human unity or solidarity' is in short supply (1977, 85 and 295) . 
